viruses are at risk of potential occupational exposure. This article describes an employee's percutaneous exposure to a recombinant non-highly attenuated vaccinia virus with subsequent infection. Lessons learned from the incident investigation set the basis for improved work practices, refinements in the medical surveillance plan, and proactive measures to preclude recurrence.
Introduction
Vaccinia virus, an orthopoxvirus with a close relationship to cowpox virus, was successfully used as an efficient vaccine in humans to provide cross-reactive protection against variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox. Following massive global vaccination campaigns against smallpox, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared smallpox eradicated in 1980 (Fenner, 1993) . Nevertheless, the last decades have encountered a renewed scientific interest in the use of vaccinia virus. The resurgence of biomedical science employing vaccinia virus or related orthopoxviruses has taken two divergent routes: 1) as a biosecurity concern, identified by the National Institutes of Health/Department of Defense as Category A biosecurity concerns (NIAID, 2014) , particularly after the events of September 11, 2001 (Strikas et al., 2008 , and 2) as a research model because of the beneficial capabilities as recombinant vectors for disease prevention or therapeutics. These include applications for other human orthopoxvirus infections, various infectious diseases including hemor-rhagic fever viruses and HIV, and cancer immunotherapy (Moss, 2011; Walsh & Dolin, 2011) . As the general public has not been routinely immunized with vaccinia, following the smallpox eradication, the overall global immunity against orthopoxviruses has waned over time.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recognized the specific risks for laboratory workers, causing the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) to issue recommendations that anyone working with replication-competent non-highly attenuated vaccinia virus or cowpox virus strains should have been vaccinia immunized within the preceding 10 years (Rotz et al., 2001) ; for work with monkeypox viruses, a revaccination is recommended every 3 years. Due to the contraindications and potential for severe adverse reactions to vaccinia vaccine (CDC, 2003) , a considerable reluctance exists among laboratory workers to be immunized (Benzekri et al., 2010) . Without immunity against vaccinia virus, the risk of developing a laboratory-acquired infection (LAI) after inadvertent exposure increases, as a number of case reports have demonstrated (Byers, 2005; CDC, 2008 CDC, , 2009 Lewis et al., 2006) . This article presents a percutaneous laboratory-acquired exposure to recombinant vaccinia virus and infection in a laboratory worker who had no history of vaccinia immunization. The incident dates back to 2007 and was listed in a 
Case Presentation
The laboratory was working at animal biosafety level 2 (BSL2-N) with a recombinant New York City Board of Health strain (NYCBH) of vaccinia containing DNA sequences encoding for the HIV-1 envelope gene gp160 with approval by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. The employees were wearing personal protective equipment (PPE), as required for the institution's Small Animal Facility, including gloves, solid-front splashimpervious gown, hair bonnet, face mask, and shoe covers. Deviating from the typical work flow, two laboratory workers (instead of only one) were handling mice and immunizing them by intraperitoneal route in the same 4-foot (1.2 m Vaccinia Virus-Laboratory Tool with a Risk of Laboratory-acquired Infection wide) biosafety cabinet (BSC). The personnel included a 31-year-old female (affected laboratory worker) with 6 months of experience in handling and injecting mice, and a second laboratory worker with over 10 years of experience.
The affected laboratory worker moved an immunized mouse back into its cage inside the BSC while the second person held a 1 ml syringe in the hand, ready for injections into the mice. In returning to her position in the BSC, the affected laboratory worker sustained a minor sharps injury from the needle attached to the syringe containing recombinant vaccinia virus at a concentration of 1×10 8 pfu/ml. The scrape broke through her glove and broke the skin on the back of her hand. The plunger of the syringe was not pushed during the incident.
Immediately following the percutaneous exposure, the affected worker removed her gloves, observed little blood at the site of the scrape, extensively sprayed the hand with 70% ethanol, and washed her hands thoroughly with water and soap. She sought immediate attention in the Emergency Department of the laboratory's affiliated Medical Center where an Infectious Disease consult was obtained. The incident was communicated to the CDC for treatment advice and reported to local and federal agencies including the Medical Center's Institutional Biosafety Board and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, the local Public Health Department, and as per the NIH's Guidelines for the Use of Recombinant DNA (NIH, 2013) to the Office of Biotechnology Activities at the National Institutes of Health.
Three days after the incident, the laboratory worker developed a typical vaccinia-associated vesicular lesion at the local site of exposure ( Figure 1A ). She was instructed to stay out of work and was closely followed by Occupational Health Services with daily communication and wound evaluation. Nine days after the incident, she developed worsening pain in her hand; erythema and swelling developed around the site of the needle scrape. Two days later, in addition to localized pain and swelling ( Figure 1B) , the employee developed systemic symptoms with chills, diffuse aches, and mild pain in the right axilla. Although she developed regional adenopathy in the epitrochlear and axillary lymph nodes, she remained afebrile. She was admitted to the hospital for observation, and she received antibiotic treatment with vancomycin, then cefalozin for suspected bacterial superinfection. Overnight, fever developed up to 100.7ºF (38.2ºC). Broad-spectrum antibiotics were started to cover for bacterial cellulitis. A swab for bacterial culture showed no growth, and the broadspectrum antibiotics were discontinued. Active vaccinia replication was confirmed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from an unroofed small area of the lesion. Coordinated daily communication with the CDC, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and the Boston Public Health Commission was involved in the laboratory worker's clinical management. After clinical improvement, she was discharged to her home after 2 days. About a month after the incident, the lesion on the hand had developed an eschar that fell off, and the employee was allowed to return to work. Besides a scar on the back of the hand that developed when the scab fell off, no long-term effects of the vaccinia infection were experienced.
A thorough review of this incident was conducted at laboratory and institution levels by a multi-disciplinary team consisting of representatives from Environmental Health & Safety/Biosafety, Occupational Health with consultation from Infectious Disease, Research Compliance, and Research & Academic Affairs, with participation of representative researchers. The affected employee had completed all required training in general research safety, biosafety, animal handling, and in the use of infectious agents in animals. All work had been performed within the BSC. One of the key factors found to contribute to the accident was that two persons, using sharps, infectious agents, and laboratory mice, were working within one 1.2 m-wide BSC. Additionally, only a single layer of gloving was donned while injecting mice with vaccinia virus. The training of the employees had addressed vaccinia immunization; however, neither the affected person nor the second laboratory worker had been vaccinia immunized within the preceding 10 years. A signed declination form had not been obtained.
Articles Figure 1 A. Vesicular lesion at the site of a scrape on the back of the hand with a needle containing recombinant vaccinia at day 3 after exposure. B. At day 11, pustule with surrounding increased erythema and swelling.
Measures Taken to Preclude Recurrence
At the laboratory level, formal standard operating procedures were revised or written to address key practices. When the use of sharps is required in conjunction with a potentially infectious agent in live animals, only one person is allowed to work within a BSC. For any exceptions, approved standard operating procedures have to be in place. For work with potentially infectious agents, the practice of double gloving was recommended as a good practice for work with infectious substances; it was recognized that double gloving would not have had an impact on a needle stick. After a subsequent review, eye protection was added to the required PPE when working with replicationcompetent vaccinia. Additionally, a laboratory-wide retraining of laboratory workers on general biosafety practices with highlighting of the key practices was performed.
At the institutional level, this incident prompted a review of practices and policies regarding the use of vaccinia virus in the institution's laboratories. The institutional practice at the time of the incident required that workers with direct occupational exposure to replication-competent vaccinia virus be offered immunization with the option to decline vaccination. As a result of the incident, an institutional policy was issued that clearly defines occupational exposure to vaccinia viruses, creates a formal method for identifying exposed workers, and requires their mandatory medical counseling on the risks and benefits of vaccinia immunization for exposed workers and their families or close contacts. Anyone receiving a vaccinia vaccination is instructed, as part of the medical surveillance plan, about appropriately covering the vaccination site and hygienic measures to prevent spread of the virus to another body area or to another person by inadvertent contact (Rotz et al., 2001; Talbot et al., 2004) . Moreover, a reporting system for work-related incidents involving hazards was standardized with risk assessment, root cause analysis, corrective actions, and sharing lessons learned. Measures taken include, but are not limited to, continuous improvement in compliance, monitoring of incidents, targeted education (e.g., on sharps alternatives, safety-engineered sharps, needlestick-resistant gloves, safe handling of sharps, animal biosafety level 2 work procedures) to prevent incidents, risk assessment for use of hazards, competency-based training, and proactive "training of the trainers" (i.e., of laboratory safety officers) to attempt to establish a safety culture.
Discussion
To mitigate the risk of LAI for work with vaccinia virus, as for work with any infectious agents, adequate laboratory safety is crucial including implementation of safe work practices, enhanced PPE (e.g., eye and face protection, fluid-resistant gown or coverall), use of engineering devices (e.g., safety-engineered needles or scalpels, replacement of sharps by alternatives, BSC) and adherence to appropriate administrative controls (e.g., agent-and procedure-specific training, standard operating procedures, standardized inci-dent follow-up, and reporting guidelines; and a medical surveillance plan including but not limited to counseling on immunizations, assessment of medical risk factors relevant to the work with the infectious agent, post-exposure treatment, and follow-up). Immediate first aid is crucial after exposure (such as thorough washing of the exposed skin area or use of eye wash for eye splashes) to attempt to minimize the risk of infection or to reduce potential symptoms. However, first aid measures taken may not be sufficient to prevent infection, as the presented case shows.
Like the Wyeth, Lister, LC16M8, Copenhagen, and Western Reserve strains, the NYCBH that caused the presented LAI is a replication-competent, non-highly attenuated strain of vaccinia. The live vaccinia vaccine ACAM-2000 ® (Acambis, Cambridge, MA), licensed as smallpox vaccine and recommended as a prophylaxis when working with replication-competent vaccinia (Greenberg & Kennedy, 2008) , was grown in Vero cell cultures and is derived from the previous lyophilized calf-lymph type NYCBH vaccine Dryvax ® (Wyeth, Dallas, TX) (Monath et al., 2004) . Thus, a NYCBH-based vaccinia vaccine is used to prevent disease from an accidental exposure to vaccinia.
The concentration of recombinant NYCBH in the needle (1×10 8 pfu/ml) that caused the presented LAI was very close to the final potency of vaccinia in a vial of ACAM-2000 ® (1-5×10 8 pfu/ml) (Monath et al., 2004) . As for vaccinia immunization, only a small droplet of vaccine caused an infection or "take" reaction. However, in contrast to an LAI or other unintended non-controlled exposure that could potentially involve high doses of virus to the eyes or fingers or use of recombinants, the administration of vaccinia is performed under medical supervision to a well-defined area of the deltoid by multiple pricks with a bifurcated needle holding a droplet that allows dose minimization with optimized immune responses (Rotz et al., 2001) . Exposure to recombinant vaccinia could potentially result in antibody development against the recombinant gene product that may cause false-positive assay results. For example, an exposure to a recombinant vaccinia-based HIV vaccine does not cause HIV disease but could potentially result in HIV vaccine-induced HIV seropositivity (Cooper et al., 2010) , presenting potential socioeconomic and psychological problems for the exposed individual.
Vaccinia immunization carries the risk of severe adverse reactions, particularly in individuals with contraindications. Severe adverse reactions to vaccinia vaccination or exposure that can be life-threatening may include eczema vaccinatum, erythema multiforme, post-vaccinial encephalitis, progressive vaccinia, generalized vaccinia, ocular vaccinia with vaccinia keratitis, myocarditis, and pericarditis (for more details, see the References for CDC, 2004b CDC, , 2007 Rotz et al., 2001) . The severity of symptoms depends on multiple factors such as vaccinia immunity (including history of vaccinia immunization), general immune status, location or route and dose of exposure, age of the affected person, pre-existing dermatitis disorders, and cardiac diseases, and others. A number of contraindications preclude individuals from vaccinia vaccination (Table 1) (Casey et al., 2006; Rotz et al., 2001; Wharton et al., 2003) . Due to potential contact transmissions that may cause secondary or tertiary vaccinia (CDC, 2004a; Garde et al., 2004; Young et al., 2011) , contraindications may also exist if close contacts have certain health conditions. To minimize the potential of contact vaccinia after immunization, extensive instructions for the vaccinee are necessary. Due to the risks associated with immunization, vaccinia administration is not indicated for work with poorly replicating or replication-defective strains, such as modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA, derived from vaccinia virus Ankara), NYVAC (derived from vaccinia virus Copenhagen), ALVAC (derived from canarypox virus), or TROVAC (derived from fowlpox virus), that do not cause productive infection (Rotz et al., 2001) .
Hence, a health risk assessment should be conducted to evaluate risks versus benefits of vaccination. In the presented case, the institution strengthened its medical surveillance program. For any laboratory worker planning to use replication-competent human or monkey orthopoxviruses, mandatory counseling on vaccinia immunization was instituted. This includes a risk assessment for vaccinia immunization and screening for contraindications. Following the medical counseling, the eligible employee either gets vaccinia immunized or she/he declines the immunization in writing on a declination form. However, if Occupational Health Services determine a contraindication against vaccinia vaccination, they will recommend additional precautions and temporary or permanent work restriction to keep the worker and others safe. Since the vaccination is not mandatory as per State or City Public Health policies and because documentation of vaccinia vaccination is usually not a prerequisite in the hiring process of a laboratory worker, the consensus at the institution was that an employee declining vaccinia immunization will be allowed to work with the virus after medical counseling and clearance.
Since 2004, 26 laboratory-related orthopoxvirus exposures have been reported and 14 of those resulted in infections, according to the ACIP (U.S. HHS & CDC, 2014) . In comparison, the ACIP estimated the probability of adverse events, mainly myo-and pericarditis, on the order of about 1 case per 180 vaccinees; the rate for deaths was reported as 1 in 1 million vaccinees (U.S. HHS & CDC, 2014) . In light of the substantial adverse events from immunization with replication-competent orthopoxviruses, a continuous critical evaluation of risks and benefits for laboratory workers (handling the same pathogen as the vaccine) and their close contacts is necessary.
Surveys have shown (Benzekri et al., 2010 ; Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, 2004 ) that a considerable number of laboratory workers without contraindications against vaccinia vaccination choose to decline vaccinia immunization, partially due to the significant risks of the vaccine. This is consistent with the authors' experience. When non-highly attenuated vaccinia virus is used infrequently or for limited experiments, an even higher likelihood of declining immunization is evident. Thus, a question needs to be raised whether the risks of vaccinia immunization can be avoided (e.g., by a safer licensed vaccine).
Various immunization studies using highly attenuated MVA in non-human primates or in clinical trials have demonstrated promising results that MVA is safe, well tolerated, and immunogenic (Earl et al., 2004; Frey et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 2013; Hatch et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2013; Wilck et al., 2010) . Highly attenuated vaccinia, such as MVA, was shown to minimize primary cutaneous lesions induced by a challenge with replication-competent vaccinia and to reduce viral shedding, indicating that replication-incompetent vaccinia strains could serve as a primer to modulate the immune response and allow subsequent immunization with a standard vaccinia vaccine (see the review by Walsh and Dolin [2011] ). These studies also suggested that vaccination with highly attenuated vaccinia strains would protect against a subsequent vaccinia challenge. MVA is licensed in Canada as IMVAMUNE ® (Bavarian Nordic, Denmark) for use in individuals with contraindications against replication-competent vaccinia and in the European Union as IMVANEX ® (Bavarian Nordic, Denmark) for emergency use in the general population for protection against smallpox. MVA is stored as IMVAMUNE ® in the United States in the Strategic National Stockpile, but not yet licensed (U.S. HHS & CDC, 2014) . During a recent meeting, the ACIP discussed the use of the current non-highly attenuated vaccinia vaccine in laboratory personnel and the potential future role for the highly attenuated MVA-based vaccine in vaccinations for laboratory workers handling human orthopoxviruses and recombinants (U.S. HHS & CDC, 2014); the policy is currently under Articles Table 1 Contraindications to Vaccinia Vaccination Applying to potential vaccinee and close contacts: • Immunodeficiency; immunosuppressive therapy • Pregnancy • Eczema, other forms of dermatitis, and disruptive skin diseases • Cardiac diseases Applying to potential vaccinee: • Breastfeeding • Allergy to vaccine components • Moderate or severe acute illness revision. Introducing replication-defective vaccines such as MVA with fewer adverse effects, either used alone (e.g., as repeated immunization) or in combination with a subsequent boost immunization with standard vaccinia vaccine, may help improve acceptance of vaccinia immunization by laboratory workers and thus increase the safety of laboratory workers and others.
Conclusion
To minimize the risk of a LAI, adequate work procedures including avoidance of sharps or aerosols and enhanced PPE have to be strictly followed. Laboratory workers need to know about the risks related to the vaccinia virus and methods to minimize those risks. Counseling on vaccinia immunization and offering vaccination before work begins with vaccinia virus are crucial parts of an adequate medical surveillance program for laboratory workers. Due to the considerable potential health risks associated with vaccinia immunization and a substantial number of laboratory-acquired vaccinia infections nationally, licensing of safer vaccines such as replication-incompetent vaccinia strains is needed to increase adequate immunizations in laboratory workers and to reduce the risk of disease.
